



**POLICY BRIEF**

# RETHINKING THE JUST TRANSITION IN THE DRC

TO MAKE THE DRC A “SOLUTIONS COUNTRY” NOT ONLY  
FOR THE WORLD, BUT FOR AND WITH ITS OWN PEOPLE

*Solutions for its country, with and  
for its communities.*



## NOTRE TERRE SANS PÉTROLE

It is a campaign that **calls for the permanent abandonment of all future oil projects** in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and globally. **It promotes energy alternatives that respect the environment and the rights of local communities.** Inspired by the [StopEACOP](#) campaign, **this initiative raises awareness and advocates for a stronger global fight against fossil fuels expansion.**

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) occupies a strategic position in the face of the global climate crisis. With its vast forests in the Congo Basin, its water resources and its minerals essential to the energy transition, it is often presented as a “**solutions country**”: a key player for the planet and a crucial supplier of green technologies. But behind this promising image lies a paradox. At the heart of global ecological balances, the DRC remains vulnerable, facing deforestation, food and energy insecurity, pollution, dependence on extractive industries, high social inequalities and multiple environmental governance challenges. The country's political ecology thus reflects several contradictions: a desire for sustainability oriented towards the outside world on the one hand, and the environmental vulnerability of local territories on the other; enormous ecological wealth but economic dependence; a discourse on equity, but the persistent exclusion of local communities.

These tensions are evident in the struggles of indigenous peoples and local communities who denounce the threats to their lands, forests and fishing grounds from oil exploitation; the loss of vital spaces due to mega-dams; pollution linked to mining; the grabbing of forests in the name of carbon projects; abuses and growing poverty around strictly protected nature reserves, despite promises of co-benefits. Often presented as drivers for development, these projects bring often little benefit to local populations. Poor management of natural resources accelerates the degradation of forests, soils and water, while exacerbating health risks. This gap between the country's international ambitions and commitments and the reality experienced by local communities reveals an urgent need to rethink the ecological transition from a perspective of environmental justice that takes the needs of the Congolese people seriously.

## KEY FINDING

The demands of indigenous peoples and local communities in the DRC show that the transition as outlined by the Congolese government remains guided by external priorities and too often ignores environmental justice in the DRC. This transition cannot be fair or sustainable for the Congolese people under these conditions, and must refocus on three inseparable requirements: **(1) guaranteeing the effective enjoyment by the Congolese people of the ecosystem services (water, forests, soil, biodiversity) on which their livelihoods depend; (2) ensuring their full participation in decisions affecting their territories, from policy design to monitoring and (3) recognising and integrating their organisations, interests and perspectives into the definition and implementation of these policies.** This implies considering ecosystems, species and natural processes not only as resources to be exploited, but as actors to be respected and protected.

These three dimensions of environmental justice distribution, participation, and recognition will give local and credible substance to the label of “solutions country.” Without this refocusing, the effects of extractive and polluting activities denounced by the populations will continue to be ignored. Congolese political ecology would then risk to reproduce historical imbalances and colonial and neocolonial dynamics, weakening living environments and undermining the credibility of climate commitments. With this refocusing, on the contrary, it can become a real lever for justice and sustainability, anchored in Congolese realities.



## OBJECTIVES OF THIS PAPER

This paper has three complementary objectives. **First, it aims to relay the demands of indigenous peoples, local communities and civil society organisations against oil, mining, water and forestry projects that harm ecosystems, deprive people of their livelihoods and exacerbate inequalities.** This position is based on a paradox: presented as a “**solutions country**” for the planet’s ecological transition, the DRC remains undermined by deforestation, pollution, overexploitation, poor governance resource management and inequalities, while advocating a political ecology that excludes communities.

The second objective is to propose a new direction for Congolese political ecology, focused on local realities rather than solely on the priorities of global ecological transition. This orientation, which aims to define a “**just transition**”, is based on two pillars: on the one hand, territorialising environmental policies, based on the needs, interests and knowledge of local communities and indigenous peoples, and on the other hand, guaranteeing real participation, equitable redistribution of benefits and recognition of local knowledge as the foundations of sustainability.

Finally, this paper makes concrete recommendations for **integrating this just transition into the heart of national and international policies**: developing a clear vision for the energy transition, taking into account sectoral diversity; promoting inclusive governance; ensuring free, prior and informed consent; strengthening financial transparency; making green investments conditional on social and ecological criteria; and recognising the central role of indigenous peoples and local communities.

## KEY ISSUES IDENTIFIED

Three major issues – related to environmental justice – are at the heart of this proposal for a just transition and transparent governance in the DRC: **distribution, participation and recognition.**

Firstly, most studies on conservation effectiveness show that equity and effectiveness go hand in hand. When local communities truly benefit from the gains (income, ecosystem services, infrastructure), conservation becomes more effective, efficient and sustainable. Secondly, recent studies on the governance of protected areas indicate that the more inclusive and locally-led governance is, the better the ecological (preservation of forests, wildlife, water) and social (livelihoods, conflict reduction) outcomes. Moving from exclusive arrangements to co-managed or community-based models significantly improves the effects of conservation. Finally, half a century of conservation research emphasizes that approaches based on local practices, experiential knowledge and customary institutions are the best way to ensure effective and equitable conservation.

The case studies we develop in this document confirm these three points. That is why we propose a just transition that concretely integrates distribution, participation and recognition, placing local actors at the centre of conservation. Adopting this framework allows us to usefully critique current Congolese political ecology—when it ignores these principles and to open concrete avenues for reform to align climate objectives, ecosystem protection and community rights.

## PROPOSED AREAS OF TRANSFORMATION

Four areas are considered in this paper to achieve the desired objectives.

1. **Redefining Congolese political ecology** : the label of “**solutions country**” places the DRC at the centre of global debates on ecology, but it must now be rooted in the local realities of Congolese men and women. For this ambition to be meaningful, environmental and natural resource management policies must be based on the needs, interests, knowledge and priorities of the Congolese people. This bottom-up approach must become the driving force behind programmes related to the environment and sustainable development.
2. **Uniting current initiatives for a just transition** : political ecology is above all a space for fighting for rights and their implementation. But having rights or making your demands heard is not enough. We must organise and strengthen the movements that carry these voices, anchoring them in the realities of indigenous peoples and local communities. These legitimate movements are essential for transforming demands into concrete political action.
3. **Build a clear inventory of local demands** : to place these voices at the heart of environmental policies, it is necessary to identify, document and disseminate the demands of indigenous peoples and local communities. This work should enable them to be presented in a coherent manner to the Congolese authorities, donors and international organisations.
4. **Strengthen advocacy on known challenges** : affected populations are already denouncing the destruction of their territories, water and soil from oil, mining and logging operations. These findings are well known: this document sets out specific and actionable recommendations to address them and ensure that the ecological transition in the DRC is truly fair and inclusive.




### KEY MESSAGE

The DRC must not only be a “solutions country” for the planet, but first and foremost for and with indigenous peoples and local communities. This requires that its political ecology embrace the principles of a truly just transition, driven from the ground up: equitable access to ecosystem services, local redistribution of benefits, meaningful participation in policy-making, recognition of their knowledge and good governance.



# A 'SOLUTIONS COUNTRY' FOR WHOM?



« As the owner and guardian of the environmental potential sought by the world to address the challenges of climate change, the Democratic Republic of Congo presents its forests, mangroves, peatlands, freshwater resources and strategic minerals as a 'Natural Response' to climate issues. The DRC is 'the solutions country' to the climate crisis. »

*(Excerpt from the closing speech at Pre-COP27 in Kinshasa, by Her Excellency Eve Bazaiba Masudi, then Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Environment and Sustainable Development of the DRC, 3-5 October 2022)*

The DRC is often presented as a solution for the planet because of its immense natural resources and its central role in regulating the global climate. However, behind this promising image lies a much more fragile reality: the country remains deeply vulnerable, both ecologically and humanely. Ecologically, although the DRC is one of the lowest emitters of greenhouse gases, it is experiencing rapid environmental degradation. By 2024, it had lost approximately 590,000 hectares of primary tropical forest - an increase of 60,000 hectares compared to 2023 - due to the expansion of commercial and subsistence agriculture, extractive industries and associated infrastructure, as well as climate change itself in the form of forest fires. This makes it the third most affected country in the world in terms of deforestation (WRI, 2025). This loss reduces carbon sequestration capacities, disrupts local climate regulation and exacerbates soil erosion.

Widespread pollution of rivers, groundwater and air, particularly in mining and urban areas, exacerbates this situation. The chemicals used in mining and the lack of industrial waste treatment are causing lasting contamination of ecosystems. At the same time, the DRC, despite being ranked among the ten most "mega-biodiverse" countries, is experiencing the accelerated disappearance of many animal and plant species (WWF, 2024). A projected temperature rise of +1.7°C to +4.5°C by the end of the century, accompanied by irregular rainfall and increased extreme weather events such as droughts and floods (World Bank, 2025) will only compound these issues.

On a human level, these ecological imbalances have serious social and health consequences. Deforestation, pollution and disruption of agricultural seasons threaten the food security of rural communities, most of which depend on subsistence farming. Nearly 80% of diseases in the DRC are linked to environmental degradation, particularly waterborne and respiratory diseases. Added to this are forced displacements caused by mining projects and the loss of traditional living spaces, and cultural and spiritual landmarks. Women and indigenous peoples are the most vulnerable. Approximately 75% of women live below the poverty line, with limited access to land, healthcare and justice, which increases their vulnerability and that of their families (DRC, 2020).

**Thus, environmental degradation in the DRC is not only an ecological issue, but a major socio-ecological crisis that affects the living conditions, health and dignity of the Congolese population and highlights the urgency of environmental governance in the DRC.** The label of "solutions country" will only take on its full meaning if it manages to address these deep-rooted vulnerabilities by placing the Congolese people, in particular local and indigenous communities, at the centre of ecological transition policies.



## NEED FOR CLARIFICATION

The label of “**solutions country**” in the DRC is not just a slogan. It reflects a political will to place ecological issues at the heart of public policy, as has been observed in other African countries since the 1990s with the emergence of the concept of sustainable development that aims to reconcile conservation and economic development. **This approach is based on a vision of the environment focused on ecosystem services, i.e. the benefits that nature provides to society (water, forests, soil, biodiversity).**

However, in practice its programs often conflict with the needs of local populations. In practice, they can be accompanied by pollution, loss of space and livelihoods and fishing grounds, deforestation and land grabbing in the name of energy, forestry or carbon projects. Presented as drivers of development, these projects rarely benefit communities in the long term, exacerbating poverty, ecosystem degradation and health risks. This discrepancy reveals a persistent tension between global ambitions and local environmental justice.

These adverse effects can be explained by the country's dependence on extractive development models focused on growth and intensive exploitation of natural resources – particularly the export of raw materials without processing or the creation of local value chains. This choice, which is supposed to finance development while supporting conservation, generates contradictions: it increases social inequalities and blocks any truly sustainable transition (Büscher, Dressler & Fletcher, 2014). Numerous studies show that effective political ecology must be based on the experiences of indigenous peoples and local communities, integrating their knowledge, needs and realities (Dawson et al., 2024a). It is essential to involve these communities as active participants, not simply as beneficiaries. In concrete terms, this means giving full legitimacy to community knowledge that recognises nature as a subject of rights and a living organism, inseparable from a vital ecological balance. Ecosystems, species and natural dynamics must be seen not as resources to be exploited, but members of the same community of life. The idea is to ensure that any management or development decision considers this ecological system and the well-being of nature, as well as the rights of local and indigenous communities.

Furthermore, research based on evidence from the field shows that the most equitable and participatory approaches also produce the best ecological and social outcomes. The more inclusive and locally rooted governance is, the more sustainable and beneficial conservation is for all (Dawson et al., 2024b). Thus, to give real substance to the “**solutions country**” label, the DRC must refocus its policies and investments on these three principles : **distribution, participation and recognition**. Only then can the ecological transition be fair, effective and rooted in Congolese realities, serving both the planet and its people.

# PUTTING THE “SOLUTIONS COUNTRY” LABEL TO THE TEST

We present five short case studies that put the “solutions country” label to the test and shed light on the challenges of a just transition in the DRC. Observed from within the Congolese territories, they show both the limits of Congolese political ecology and how to build concrete environmental justice, co-developed with communities.

1. **Strategic minerals** illustrate the limitations of formal rights and policies if they are not translated into effective access and control for local populations
2. The impacts of **industrial logging and emerging carbon projects** highlight the need to reclaim territories in the face of dispossession dynamics.
3. The **oil issue** reveals more than 50 years of exploitation without any real local development, and yet followed by a new launch of blocks in 2022 and 2025.
4. So-called “**green**” **energies** pose the problem of mega-development projects with heavy social and ecological impacts, often translating into an ecology of illusions.
5. The **Kivu–Kinshasa Green Corridor** is an important innovation, but it can only be credible if it is based on structural environmental justice, reconfigured with economic and environmental conditionality aligned with the interests of indigenous peoples and local communities.

## DESTRUCTION OF TERRITORIES AND ECOSYSTEMS : STRATEGIC MINERALS

The DRC has long had a two-tiered political ecology: on the one hand, strict conservation of protected areas that impose severe restrictions on access to and use of forests by indigenous peoples and local communities (RFUK, 2016); on the other, polluting exploitation of resources. This contradiction harms both people and the environment, to the point of sabotaging conservation objectives and ecosystem services. The extraction of strategic minerals is the most telling example: concessions encroaching on or fragmenting protected areas, access roads leading to deforestation, water and land pollution, and forced displacement in short, conservation that is proclaimed but contradicted by extractive practices.

Admittedly, the revised Mining Code (2018) and the Environmental Protection Act (2011) exist, but their enforcement is hampered by corruption, lack of resources and the impunity of certain companies. Environmental defenders are sometimes threatened or criminalised, further widening the justice gap. In Lualaba, Haut-Katanga and South Kivu, soil, river and air pollution affect health, food security and social cohesion; deforestation, biodiversity loss and soil depletion further weaken communities whose rights are too often violated (Afriwatch & RAID, 2024).

This situation highlights three key issues. First, the global energy transition cannot be “fair” if it is based on dispossessing communities in the South to fuel green technologies in the North; it requires a new form of governance, equitable redistribution of benefits, strict compliance with social and environmental standards, and respect for human rights. Second, it reveals a historical constant: Congolese territories are sacrificed in the name of external progress yesterday colonial industrialisation, today the green transition which amounts to structural environmental racism where Congolese lives and knowledge count for little. Finally, the definition of community rights is unclear and their recognition remains often symbolic: without effective implementation, communities continue to struggle to control their resources and exercise their sovereignty.



## COMMODIFICATION OF TERRITORIES AND INEQUALITIES: FORESTS AND CARBON

With its forests and peatlands covering millions of hectares capable, according to estimates, of absorbing more CO<sub>2</sub> each year than the Amazon (OFAC, 2021) the DRC wants to position itself as a major player in the face of the climate and biodiversity crises. To finance this ambition, the government is relying on voluntary carbon markets (VCMs). However, a recent study by Rainforest Foundation UK shows that these projects often come with environmental, social and ethical abuses.

There are 71 carbon projects covering approximately 103 million hectares, almost half of the country's land area, in addition to 80 million hectares of concessions assigned for carbon credit certification schemes without a specific geographical location. The sector remains opaque: the national registry, published late in 2024, is incomplete, and only three projects appear to have sold credits internationally. Many concessions are controlled by former loggers who have converted to forestry, often on already exploited forests, which raises questions about the ecological value of the projects. Irregularities are common: illegal allocations, lack of consultation, violations of the Forest Code.

For local communities, the promises of benefits are largely illusory. The right to free, prior and informed consent (FPIC), although recognised in the 2017 ministerial decree FPIC in the context of REDD+ projects in the 2022 law on the promotion and protection of indigenous Pygmy peoples, is regularly violated; women and young people are excluded from decision-making. These projects fuel land tensions, conflicts and capture by elites, often without bring developmental and climate benefits. Worse still, they hamper community forestry by blocking access to collective land titles that are essential for autonomous management and self-determination (RFUK 2025). **Two issues emerge: on the one hand, “green innovation” masks highly asymmetrical power relations; on the other hand, top-down design perpetuates a colonial logic that dispossesses communities.** Here, environmental justice is not ignored: it is obstructed.





## EXTRACTION WITHOUT DEVELOPMENT: MUANDA AND OIL BLOCKS

Oil exploitation illustrates the duality of Congolese political ecology. The DRC is banking on oil to stimulate growth and combat poverty, but after decades of exploitation, these promises have not materialised. On the contrary, the negative effects on people's livelihoods and health are exacerbating precariousness. The case of Muanda, in the far west of the country, is a striking example.

In Muanda, where Perenco, Socir and Surestream operate, oil activity, presented as an engine of development, is causing profound and often irreversible changes: loss of agricultural land; water pollution (rivers, ocean, groundwater); destruction of biodiversity (coconut trees, oil palms, cassava, mahogany, fisheries); decline in subsistence agriculture and small-scale fishing. The result is increased dependence on imported products and growing vulnerability for local communities already exposed to climate change. The oil revenues that are supposed to finance development hardly benefit the inhabitants: the redistribution mechanisms (Muanda Development Consultation Committee and Muanda Territory Consultation Committee) are perceived as opaque and politicised, fueling mistrust and social tensions. Added to this are the heavy militarisation of oil-producing areas (intimidation, restrictions on movement, conflicts) and the lack of decent local jobs, with skilled positions often being outsourced all factors that exacerbate the social impacts of oil. More discreet but equally serious is symbolic violence: the erasure of cultural landmarks and the disappearance of sacred forests and ritual sites are undermining spiritual practices and identity (IDEL, 2025).

This experience shows why civil society organisations are contesting the plan to grant dozens more oil blocks. They argue that these projects are likely to accelerate the destruction of nature especially when the blocks located in protected areas and peatlands—and increase the vulnerability of populations, particularly the poorest. For a transition to be fair, local communities must be placed at the centre of decisions and benefits.

## AGAINST AN ECOLOGY OF ILLUSIONS: INGA AND VIRUNGA

The Inga III dam project and the Virunga Park energy initiatives offer two opposing visions of ecological transition in the DRC. Inga III, the successor to the Inga I and II dams, embodies a technocratic utopia of centralised modernisation: producing 40,000 MW of electricity, mainly for global markets and extractive industries. Behind this promise of green energy lie the risk of population displacement, cultural loss and lasting damage to biodiversity. This project, presented as a symbol of sustainable development, perpetuates an extractivist logic: the profits go to the state and investors, while the social and ecological costs are borne by local communities. This model feeds what some call an “ecology of illusions”, where talk of transition masks the dispossession and marginalisation of local knowledge.

In contrast, Virunga National Park is charting a different course. Although it remains an area of tension marked by deforestation, economic pressures and spreading armed conflict, its renewable energy projects like micro-hydroelectric plants are helping promote development that supports local communities, creates jobs and better protects ecosystems. However, these initiatives remain fragile: their sustainability, genuine inclusiveness and ability to benefit the poorest, particularly indigenous peoples and displaced communities, can still be strengthened.

In any case, the comparison between Inga and Virunga reveals a crucial choice: to continue on the path of large, centralised projects dependent on global financial logic, or strengthen local alternatives based on social justice, territorial sovereignty and community rights. The energy and ecological future of the DRC hinges on this transition from an ecology of illusions to an ecology of justice.




## JUSTICE THROUGH RECOGNITION: THE GREEN CORRIDOR KIVU-KINSHASA

In January 2025, the DRC launched the Green Corridor Kivu–Kinshasa, a vast 544,000 km<sup>2</sup> community-based protected area, with the aim of preserving 100,000 km<sup>2</sup> of primary forest and 60,000 km<sup>2</sup> of peatlands, under the authority of the Congolese Institute for Nature Conservation (ICCN) and managed through a public-private partnership. Presented as a climate showcase, this project aims to overcome the Congolese paradox of conservation often being a source of conflict and having little local impact, by combining ecological preservation with socio-economic development (ICCN, 2025).

Three innovations set it apart. First, its hybrid form: a protected area designed as a special economic zone, a new category that defies traditional classifications and the fortress-like, militarised logic that often characterises them. Second, an incentive strategy: encouraging “green” investment to discourage polluting activities and promoting food and energy security through tax incentives. Finally, a promise of justice: the benefits of investment must directly benefit the most vulnerable populations in the corridor. In this sense, the project seeks to anticipate environmental injustices (displacement, exclusion, land grabbing) rather than responding to them after the fact, by also introducing key safeguards such as the need for FPIC.

But this promise will only be credible if it is based on a fourth pillar in addition to distribution, participation and recognition: economic conditionality. This means that the benefits granted to investors – exemptions, permits, infrastructure – must be conditional on their environmental and social performance, measured in a transparent manner. Without this, there is a high risk that the project will become a mere exercise in greenwashing. To be fair, this conditionality must be part of a “thick green economy” based on structural reforms: recognition of land and territorial rights (e.g. community forestry), community veto rights, restrictions of exploitation and equitable redistribution of income. It is on this condition that the Green Corridor can become a true model of environmental justice, where local communities are not only beneficiaries but full participants in the governance of their territories.



# CONCLUSION

These five cases reveal the contradictions and potential of ecological transition in the DRC. Behind the label of “**solutions country**” lies a two-tier political ecology: **on the one hand, extractive and centralised projects that harm territories and exacerbate inequalities; on the other, local initiatives that seek to reconcile environmental protection and social justice.**

Strategic minerals, oil and carbon markets show that current environmental policies are still based on a logic of dispossession: resources are exploited in the name of progress, but the benefits escape the populations, while pollution, displacement and loss of territorial sovereignty are the hidden costs. These models perpetuate a form of environmental racism in which Congolese knowledge and lives remain marginalised. Conversely, **projects such as the Green Corridor Kivu Kinshasa could pave the way for a more locally rooted ecology when they are based on participation, redistribution, recognition of the rights of local communities and indigenous peoples, and transparent governance.** They remind us that the transition can only be just if it is accompanied by structural transformation: making investments conditional on verifiable social and ecological performance, guaranteeing land rights, strengthening local governance, and giving a real voice back to the populations concerned. Community Forestry Concessions (CFCLs), which enable communities to exercise collective rights over their traditional lands and manage them sustainably, are an interesting example of how a just transition can work by combining land rights, local governance, conservation planning and economic empowerment, which are essential for self-determination.

In short, the common lesson from these five cases is clear: **environmental justice is not just about protecting nature, but about rethinking power relations, linking sustainability and human dignity, and making the DRC not a “solutions country” for the world, but a solutions country for and with its people.**

# RECOMMENDATIONS

## TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DRC

- **Institutionalise environmental justice in public policy** by explicitly integrating the principles of territorial sovereignty, free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) and ecological conditionality into all relevant laws and policies..
- **Strengthen green decentralisation** by providing provinces and decentralised territorial entities with the institutional and financial capacities necessary to develop local just transition plans for land use, based on the needs of the population.
- **Advance legal reforms in land ownership**, land use, forests, biodiversity conservation and agriculture in a manner that promotes local autonomy and the rights of local communities and indigenous peoples.
- **Accelerate specific reforms and strengthen institutions** related to community forestry, community-managed protected areas (APAC) and the Indigenous Pygmy People Law (2022) to support self-determined development and participation in natural resource management.
- **Promote community initiatives in energy** and decentralised local production (micro-hydroelectricity, solar, biomass) as alternatives to megaprojects with a high social and ecological footprint.
- **End new oil and gas projects in sensitive ecosystems**, reassess existing concessions, and strengthen transparency and recourse.
- **Maintain the national moratorium on new forestry concessions** and establish a new moratorium on new carbon projects until when a robust legal framework is set in place ensuring alignment with Cancún safeguards and international standards.
- Facilitate the **creation of a multi-stakeholder framework for the implementation of the Green Corridor Kivu Kinshasa**, with shared governance, a funded plan and participatory monitoring, in accordance with the Final Declaration of civil society organisations.

## TO INTERNATIONAL DONORS AND PARTNERS

- Support citizen oversight and accountability mechanisms, including independent environmental governance observatories and multi-stakeholder platforms.
- Encourage innovative financial mechanisms, such as community climate justice funds, enabling communities to directly access resources for ecological restoration and sustainable development.
- Move away from one-size-fits-all approaches to green transition: models exported from the North must be adapted to the socio-historical realities of the DRC.
- Prioritise decentralised energy solutions such as micro-dams, which are better suited to local contexts and have less irreversible impact on communities and ecosystems.

## TO THE CONGOLESE CITIZEN MOVEMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY

- Strengthen alliances between NGOs, researchers and communities to document environmental injustices and promote advocacy rooted in local experiences.
- Provide a legal and political framework for the concept of “solutions country” to make it an instrument of social and environmental advancement rather than a tool for political legitimisation.
- Develop spaces for community consultation, particularly on land management, mining governance and carbon projects, to put people back at the centre of environmental decisions.
- Promote endogenous ecological knowledge by integrating traditional sustainable resource management practices into conservation and development policies.
- Support non-market conservation investments based on rights and cooperation (Art. 6.8 of the Paris Agreement), directing funding to local communities with transparency, co-responsibility and equitable benefits.
- Support the participation of civil society, local communities and indigenous peoples in the CVKK, including shared governance, independent citizen monitoring, effective remedies and data publication.
- Support technical and legal assistance to communities involved in ‘green’ investments and climate finance to equip them for negotiations, assess costs/risks, secure rights and make collective, free and informed decisions.

## TO LOCAL AND INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES

- Actively assert their land and territorial rights, through community forestry and local governance mechanisms recognised by Congolese law.
- Consolidate local natural resource management structures, relying on customary authorities and grassroots associations to develop ecological development plans.
- Promote intergenerational and inclusive participation by involving women and young people in territorial governance and ecological initiatives.
- Develop a cultural ecology based on the spiritual, symbolic and practical knowledge of the territories to reaffirm the link between identity, nature and justice.

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## NOTRE TERRE SANS PÉTROLE

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